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Enhancing Growth Through Structural Reform
A Study of the Dutch Economy from 1960 to 1994
Bart van Ark and Jakob de Haan*
Abstract
In this paper we analyse how structural factors concerning the labour, capital and
product market affected the economic growth of the Netherlands over the past three and
half decades. We concentrate in particular on the recent acceleration in GDP and per
capita income since 1987 and aim to establish the relation with structural reforms which
have taken place since the early 1980s. In section 2 we discuss changes in the structure of
the economy in a comparative perspective, which includes a detailed assessment of the
productivity performance of the Dutch economy and its relation to labour supply,
investment in human and physical capital and the role of changes in average firm size. In
section 3 we discuss how structural imbalances in particular on the product and capital
market have undergone major reform since the mid 1980s. We conclude that much has
already been achieved in terms of structural reform, but that more may be necessary
because of the expected continuation of a rise in labour supply. We also conclude the
recent acceleration in growth has gone together with a strong deceleration in
productivity growth, which among other things is related to the rapid rise in labour
supply since the mid 1980s. In order to prevent productivity from setting onto a path of
further slowdown, which may affect per capita income growth in the long run, a further
acceleration of GDP growth and a more effective use of human and physical capital
inputs is therefore required. To achieve these main objectives, the emphasis of structural
policies needs to stay with:
- keeping labour cost down to moderate levels, in particular by further reducing the
wedge between gross and net payments.
- stimulating the effective use of inputs, by fostering investment in human and
physical capital.
2- removing remaining structural rigidities on the product, labour and capital markets.
31. Introduction
Even though the Dutch economy has exhibited a marked improvement in terms of
growth of GDP and per capita income since the late 1980s, there has been an ongoing
concern about various structural characteristics and their impact on potential growth.
Despite the substantial increase in the number of jobs and the total number of hours
worked which has been realised since 1987, the Dutch economy needs to
accommodate for an even greater labour supply in the years to come. The need for
accelerated growth requires a continuation of structural reforms of the Dutch
economy.
The overall improvement of the growth performance of the Dutch economy can be
seen when comparing the growth of GDP and per capita income since 1987 and
before 1987 (Table 1). Between 1973 and 1987 growth of GDP and per capita
income in the Netherlands slowed down compared to the average of the OECD as
well the European Union (EU). Also in comparison to a smaller sample of eleven
Northwest European countries, which show most resemblance to the Netherlands in
terms of structural characteristics, growth slowed down considerably during that
period. The slowdown was reflected in a narrowing of the difference between th
higher level of per capita income in the Netherlands and that of the OECD and the
EU (Table 2). Labour productivity increased more rapidly than in the reference
groups during the period 1973 to 1987, but even that growth advantage for the
Netherlands declined compared to the period 1960 to 1973.
Since the late 1980s Dutch economic performance has improved both in
comparison with the recent past and relative to that of the reference groups. Growth
of per capita income has accelerated and the per capita income gap between th
Netherlands and the average for Northwest Europe declined to four percentage points
in 1994. Growth of real GDP has also been fast both relative to the period 1973-87
and in comparison with the averages for Northwest Europe, the EU and the OECD.
However, in contrast to the earlier period, labour productivity growth has slowed
down. Even though the level of GDP per hour worked in 1994 was still 12 percentage
points above the level of NW Europe and 18-19 percentage points above that of the
4OECD and the EU, this productivity advantage for the Netherlands has clearly
eroded.
To prevent productivity from setting onto a path of further slowdown, which may
affect per capita income growth in the long run, a further acceleration of GDP growth
and a more effective use of human and physical capital inputs is required. To achieve
these main objectives, the emphasis of structural policies needs to stay with:
- keeping labour cost down to moderate levels, in particular by further reducing the
wedge between gross and net payments. Measures in this field will lead to a
strengthening of competitiveness on the world market, a further increase in the
number of jobs and a decline in expenditure on social security.
- stimulating the effective use of inputs, by fostering investment in human and
physical capital. Despite the acceleration in GDP, the rapid increase of inward
foreign direct investment and an improvement in the rate of return on capital,
investment-output ratios need to increase. To match an increase in physical
investment and accommodate for the high skill intensity of the Dutch economy,
measures to improve skills of the labour force also require attention.
- removing remaining structural rigidities on the product, labour and capital markets.
Even though policies towards each of these markets cannot be seen in isolation,
flexibilisation of the labour market, strengthening of product market competition
and further liberalisation of the financial sector are crucial ingredients of an
encompassing policy to strengthen the structure of the Dutch economy.
This paper focuses primarily on the product and financial market, since the labour
market is dealt with elsewhere in more detail (for example, van Ark, de Jong and de
Haan, 1996). In the next section, the structure of the Dutch economy and changes
over the past three and half decades are analysed in a comparative perspective. The
productivity performance of the Dutch economy is decomposed into the role of
output and factor inputs; into the contribution of individual sectors of the economy;
and into the effects of changes in average firm size. This is followed by a more
detailed assessment of the individual contribution to growth of investment in physical
capital by the private and public sector, and investment in human capital which
includes education and technology. The following section provides a discussion of
structural imbalances on the labour, capital and goods markets. The pap r concludes
with a note on the need for further structural reform.
52. Structural Change in the Netherlands from 1960 to 1994
Accounting for Structural Change
Despite the acceleration of GDP and per capita income growth since 1987, there have
been voices stressing the underperformance of the Dutch economy in terms of
structural characteristics. For example, a recent study based on an estimated growth
equation for the period 1960 to 1985 suggested that the predicted growth rates for the
Dutch economy were above the actual growth rates and that this difference was
biggest of all OECD countries. However, growth equations are very sensitive to th
structural variables included and their specification. For example, when th
investment-output ratio is introduced as the key structural variable, the Dutch score
appears not to be the worst of all OECD countries even though the predicted growth
still exceeds actual growth.1
Other signs of concern came from a recent government study on the
competitiveness of the Dutch economy. The study benchmarked Dutch performance2
with regard to a range of structural variables on the average experience of three major
trading partners (Belgium, Denmark and Germany) and two leading countries which
have very different institutional characteristics (Japan and the United States). The
study identified weak, average and strong points for the Netherlands with regard to
the functioning of the goods market, the labour market and the capital market, the
investment in physical infrastructure, education and technology, monetary and
budgettary stability and an effective fiscal infrastructure. The impact of these
variables on the competitiveness of the Dutch economy was determined through their
effect on costs (of labour, capital, energy, etc.), on the supply side structure (the
availabily and quality of labour, physical infrastructure) and on the capability of
markets to adjust and innovate. In general the study concludes that the Dutch
economy has been underutilizing its potential. In the remainder of this section the
relative importance of various of these factors for growth in the recent past and
potential future growth is considered.
The slowdown in the growth rate output per hour worked may also be of concern.
The difference between growth rates of GDP per capita (Y/P) and labour productivity
6(GDP per hour: Y/H) can be decomposed into the change in the number of hours per
worker (H/L) and the change in the labour force participation (L/P) (Table 3).3
Between 1960 and 1987, the larger fall in working hours and the more rapid decline
in labour force participation in the Netherlands (in particular before 1973) accounted
for the relatively slow growth of per capita income. However, during the period
1987-1994 an important transformation occurred compared to earlier subperiods. The
decline in working hours became more moderate (although it still declined more
rapidly than in the reference groups) whereas labour force participation increased
significantly. These labour market trends are directly related to the rapid increase in
parttime employment, the incidence of worktime sharing schemes and the
introduction of a shorter average working week of 38 hours, in some cases now
going down to 36 hours. However, it should be emphasised that despite the relatively
poor productivity growth performance of the Netherlands since the late 1980s, labour
productivity levels are still considerably above the average of the reference groups
(Table 2).
Whereas labour productivity growth in the Netherlands was higher as in the
reference groups during the period 1973-1987, the fall in the total number of hours
worked was bigger than elsewhere (Diagram 1b). Since 1987 the situation has
changed dramatically. Even though many of the newly created jobs in the Netherlands
were parttime jobs, it still led to a rise in total working hours of more than 1 per cent
a year on average (Diagram 1c). By contrast the whole of Northwest Europe and the
EU experienced a further decline in total hours worked, whereas the OECD as a
whole experienced a more modest increase. However, the rise in total working hours4
was associated with a slowdown in the productivity growth in the Netherlands, which
suggests that the marginal productivity of newly created jobs has been relatively low.
The labour productivity concept does not take account of changes in capital
intensity. Between 1987 and 1994 average growth rate of the non-residential capital
stock in the Netherlands was 2.7 per cent, which was slightly below the growth rate
of the period before (Table 4). Given the average rise in total working hours, this5
implies a modest increase in capital intensity of only 1.6 per cent per year, compared
to 3.6 per cent per year for the period 1973-1987. The capital-output ratio only
increased at 0.2 per cent on average since 1987. Growth of GDP can also be
decomposed in the contribution of factor inputs (labour, schooling and physical
7capital) and total factor productivity. As in most OECD countries, total factor
productivity (TFP) growth in the Netherlands has slowed down substantially since
1973. Despite the acceleration of GDP growth since 1987, TFP growth reduced
further since 1987 to one-third to one-half of the TFP growth rate during the period
1973-1987 (Table 4).
An international comparison of growth accounts between the Netherlands and other
advanced countries (including France, Germany and the UK) suggests that TFP
growth in the Netherlands during the period 1973-1992 was faster than in France and
the UK but slower than in Germany. The data confirm the view that the Dutch
economy performed much better than the other three countries on the creation of jobs
although this effect was more than offset by the decline in working hours per person
employed. The Dutch economy performed also better than Germany and the UK on
human capital, but growth of the non-residential capital stock was somewhat slower
than in the other countries. However, the effect on growth from foreign trade was of
much less importance for the Netherlands during this period compared to the period
from 1950 to 1973.6
8Industry Structure and Firm Size
Having observed the major changes in output and productivity performance of the
Dutch economy over the past years, one should look for typical structural factors
which may explain the rapid productivity growth and subsequent slowdown. These
include the change in output and employment shares by sector, the comparative
productivity performance of those industries, and the contribution of firms of
different sizes. Since 1960 the industry structure of the Netherlands exhibited some
specific features in comparison to the average for six Northwest European countries
(Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK), which may be
summarised as follows (Diagram 2):
- The agricultural sector in the Netherlands has been relatively small in terms of
employment shares, although the average share for the six Northwest European
countries has now declined to virtually the same level. The relative productivity
level has been high compared to the productivity level for the economy as a whole,
although again the difference with the other countries declined.
- The industrial sector, particularly the manufacturing sector, has been somewhat
smaller both in terms of output and employment shares compared to other
countries. The relative productivity level in manufacturing compared to the total
economy has also been lower than the average for Northwest Europe. In contrast,
the relative productivity level for the broader industrial sector has been relatively
high, which is mainly due to the effect of the mining sector in the Netherlands
which is dominated by the exploitation of natural gas.
- The employment share of the services sector in the Dutch economy has become
relatively high in particular in trade and financial services. As the level of output
per person employed compared to that of the economy as a whole is generally
relatively high in financial services, a large employment share in this sector (and to
a lesser extent in transport and communication) has a positive impact on the overall
productivity level of the economy. However, in the case of the Netherlands the
productivity level of the financial services is not so high compared to the average
for Northwest Europe. In contrast, the productivity performance of the transport7
and communication sector in the Netherlands is relatively good.
Productivity growth can originate from an increase in output per unit of input
within the sectors or from shifts of employment from low- to high productivity
9sectors. In the case of the Netherlands the latter effect has been relatively
unimportant. For example, on the basis of the counterfactual assumption of constant
employment shares between 1973 and 1992, the average annual growth rate of GDP
per person employed would have been 0.99 instead of 0.97 per cent per year. Most of
the productivity growth in the Netherlands therefore appears to have come fro
within the sectors.8
Manufacturing sector performance
Although the importance of the manufacturing sector in terms of its share in output
and employment in the Netherlands has declined (like in other advanced countries),
the significance of this sector for the overall performance of the economy should not
be underestimated. Firstly, the number of employees which are associated with the
production of the final output in manufacturing is much larger than the number of
people actually working in manufacturing. In 1990, 800 thousand of the 962
thousand persons employed in Dutch manufacturing were involved in production for
final output. In addition another 713 thousand workers were involved in producing
intermediate inputs which were used in the manufacturing production process. A  a9
result not 18, but 29 per cent of employment in the Netherlands is actively
contributing to the creation of final output in manufacturing.
Secondly, even though manufacturing is often seen as the major sector where jobs
are lost because of continuous efficiency operations, quite a number of new jobs have
been created in this sector. Between 1979 and 1991 the manufacturing sector
experienced a decline in employment of about 0.4 per cent per year on average.
However, the average creation of new jobs in manufacturing was around 7.4 per cent
per year whereas job destruction amounted to about 7.8 per cent a year on average.10
Table 5 shows that 32 per cent of employment in manufacturing firms which existed
in 1980 and still existed in 1991 concerned activities that experienced an increase in
productivity and employment while for 47 per cent of employment productivity grew
but employment declined. Firms in basic metals and in electrical machinery were
overrepresented in the latter group, whereas the successful growers are in sectors like
food, beverages and tobacco and in chemicals, rubber and plastic products.
A third reason for emphasising the importance of the manufacturing for the growth
performance of the Dutch economy is its high level of output per hour worked and
10
low level of unit labour costs. As the Netherlands is one of the countries with the
lowest amount of annual working hours per person, the relative productivity
performance shows up much better in terms of output per hour compared to output
per person employed (Table 6). An important reason for this relatively high level of
labour productivity is the strong concentration of Dutch industry in basic chemicals,
which is characterised by a relatively high capital intensity. However, other sectors of
Dutch manufacturing, such as textiles and some other light industries, also showed
high productivity levels. Dutch manufacturing also had a relatively good position in11
terms of unit labour costs, as the high productivity performance went together with a
significant wage growth moderation during the second half of the 1980s. Despite the
strong devaluation of the US dollar, the Netherlands was still slightly more
competitive than the United States in 1994.
The strong presence of capital intensive industries in Dutch manufacturing has
raised some concern about the potential for future growth compared to typical
high-tech industries (such as electronics, pharmaceuticals, instruments, etc.) in which
the Netherlands is underrepresented. The Dutch manufacturing sector is relatively
overrepresented in low-tech industries, including the food processing industry, paper
and printing and petroleum refining, even though in 1991 its share in high tech
industries was not lower than the average for Northwest Europe (Table 7, panel A).12
However, the Dutch manufacturing sector appears to be relatively strongly
represented in so-called skill intensive industries (Table 7, panel C). The latter
segment includes typical process industries, including food processing and basic
chemicals. In conclusion, the high productivity and skill intensity of Dutch industry,
in combination with a relative healthy labour cost position may well have created a
strong comparative advantage for the Dutch economy supporting growth in the long
term.
Exposed and sheltered sectors
Another way to look at the growth performance of the Dutch economy at sectoral
level is to distinguish between an open (or exposed) sector and a domestic (or
sheltered) sector. Whereas the exposed sector faces important foreign competitive
pressures, the sheltered sector primarily produces for the domestic market, facing
much less international competition.
11
In Table 8 the classification for the exposed and sheltered sector of the Dutch
Central Planning Bureau is used. The exposed sector mainly consists of13
manufacturing, agriculture and transport and communication, and the sheltered sector
consists of trade, banking and insurances and other private services. The share of the
sheltered sector in total output has increased during the 1980s to more than 26
percent. The exposed sector showed the opposite pattern: it declined from an average
of 44 percent of GDP during the period 1960-73 to 33 percent during the period
1987-94. If the growth rate of value added of the sheltered sector would be
considerably lower than in the exposed sector, this structural development would
perhaps help explain a slowdown in real GDP growth. However, as follows from
Table 8 the growth rate of the sheltered sector was generally higher than that of the
exposed sector.
The capital-intensive nature of the exposed sector in combination with competitive
pressure to reduce labour costs, released a large number of people to find
employment in the sheltered sector. Table 8 shows that employment growth in the
sheltered sector was, on average, higher than that of the exposed sector, but the
growth rate of output per person employed was considerably lower. As a large
number of newly created jobs in the services sector were parttime jobs, the
productivity growth rate for the sheltered sector after an adjustment for average
working hours would be about 0.5 percentage points higher compared to 0.2
percentage points for the exposed sector. The unit labour cost performance of the
exposed sector has therefore been much better than in the sheltered sector, even
though the sheltered sector has also shown a considerable decline in unit labour cost
since 1987. 
The Effects of Firm Size
As in other OECD countries the share of small and medium sized firms (SMEs) in
the Netherlands has increased over the past decades, and as a result the average size
of firms has declined. Nevertheless, the Dutch economy is primarily characterised by
relatively large average firm size, that is 10 persons in the Netherlands compared to 6
persons on average for the European Union (Table 9).
The rise of small and medium sized firms has often been seen as important for the
creation of new jobs in the economy. Clearly the shift of employment from
12
commodity sectors to services sectors, where small firms are relatively more
important, has contributed to the increase of employment in small and medium sized
firms. However, despite the relatively large overall employment share of the
Netherlands in trade and financial services (compare Diagram 2), the share of these
sectors in the employment of SMEs is not higher than for the European Union as a
whole. Even in a typical "small firm" sector like trade, Dutch firms have an average
size of 7 persons compared to 4 persons for the European Union, and account for 38
per cent of all employment in firms up to 100 employees compared to an average of
41 per cent for the EU. This suggests that Dutch SMEs are less important as an
engine of job creation than in other countries. On the other hand, the share of private
community, social and personal services in SMEs appears in the Netherlands appears
to be much bigger than elsewhere (Table 9).14
Apart from the creating employment, the dynamics of SMEs in the long run also
depend on their relative productivity performance. Medium sized firms have been the
most successful productivity performers in the Netherlands. Table 10 shows that the
lower medium sized (10-99 employees) and upper medium sized (100-499
employees) firms had the highest productivity levels on the whole. In particular
manufacturing and producer services firms (which included financial services)
showed relatively high productivity in this sector, although the latter sector (together
with transport and communication) did also relatively well in the large firm size
(more than 500 employees). The relatively good performance of medium sized firms
can also be derived from Table 11. Upper medium sized firms (100-499 employees)
were most strongly overrepresented in the category of firms which have experienced
an increase in productivity as well as employment, whereas small and lower medium
sized firms (0-99 employees) are strongly overrepresented in the category which
experienced an increase in employment without a rise in productivity. The largest
firms were strongly overrepresented in the category of firms without employment
growth. It should be emphasised, however, that the large firms accounted for 43 per
cent to the overall productivity growth in manufacturing. 15
The contribution of the smallest firms to employment creation is relatively modest.
Many small starting firms disappear rapidly, in particular those which experienced no
productivity growth. After an adjustment for exits, starting firms accounted for only
33 thousand of the 158 thousand newly created jobs in the Netherlands between 1990
13
and 1993. Most employment creation has come from already existing firms, in
particular from fast growers. A panel-based study has shown that these firms,
representing approximately 10 per cent of all firms in the panel, experienced an
increase in employment of 8.4 per cent per year on average compared to 1.5 per cent
for the economy as a whole between 1987 and 1992.16
Even though the growth rate of employment in SMEs (up to 500 employees) is
estimated at 1.5 per cent per year on average over the period 1989-1995 compared to
0.25 per cent for the EU-12 as a whole, the productivity growth is only 1 per cent
compared to 1.75 per cent for the EU-12. Small firms are part of the sheltered sector
to a much larger extent than large firms. For example, in 1993 only 7 per cent of the
small firms (0-9 employees) and about 30 per cent of lower medium firms (10-99
employees) in the Netherlands were exporting enterprises compared to 55 per cent of
upper medium and large enterprises. Small and lower medium sized firms are17
therefore most likely to suffer from structural rigidities such as regulatory and
administrative burdens as far as these are more present in the sheltered than in the
exposed sector of the economy.
The Role of Investment
Savings and Investment in Physical Capital
For a long time now the Netherlands has had a surplus on the current account, which
may reflect a high level of savings and/or a low level of investment. Table 12
compares saving and investment levels in the Netherlands with European Union and
OECD averages. It follows that the savings rate in the Netherlands has been
relatively high, despite substantial government dissaving in the 1980s savings. This
is due to a high level of household saving, which in turn is partly explained by the
high level of contractual savings. Net household savings as a percentage of
disposable income over the period 1960-1993 amounted to 13.8 per cent in the
Netherlands, whereas the EU15 average was 12.0 per cent. Business savings were
also quite high during the 1980s. It also follows from Table 12 that during the 1980s
investment levels in the Netherlands were not out of line with those in other
14
countries. Still, it is clear that investment was too low in view of the high growth rate
of labour supply in the Netherlands.
Estimates of the rate of return on capital in the business sector show that
profitability in the Netherlands exceeded the European average and the rate in Japa
and the USA during the 1980s and 1990s (Table 13).
Diagram 4 shows that since the beginning of the 1970s the investment level of the
Netherlands declined and remained at that lower level. Despite the recent economic
recovery investment share of the business sector has not gone up. It also follows
from Diagram 4 that the investment level in the exposed sector is substantially higher
than in the sheltered sector. However, in recent years this gap has become smaller. 
During the period 1987-1994 foreign direct investment in the Netherlands an
Dutch investments abroad increased substantially, albeit Dutch investment abroad
was almost twice as high as foreign investment in the Netherlands (Table 14). It also
follows from the table that most investments come from, respectively go to,
countries of the European Union. Most foreign investments and investments abroad
are in manufacturing.
Public Investment
During the 1980s many OECD countries have offset increases in debt interest
payments and rising social security transfers by winding back public investment.18
The decline of government investment spending in the Netherlands is not exceptional
(Diagram 5). Public capital spending as a share of GDP declined or remained stable
in almost all OECD countries between 1980 and 1992. Public investment in the
Netherlands increased until 1968 and has declined since, which in part reflects the
completion of the Delta Project. Nevertheless spending on ground, road and
waterways is still by far the most important type of public investment amounting to
about 1.5 percent of GDP. It has been argued that the decline of government capital
formation in most OECD countries might play an important role in explaining the
poor economic performance during the 1980s, but recently some studies have reached
different conclusions.  It is therefore hard to reach definite conclusions with respect19
to the impact of government investment on the growth performance of the
Netherlands.
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Investment in Human Capital
Human capital intensity in the Netherlands, defined as the total investment in
education, technology and other stock of knowledge as a percentage of GDP, has
been relatively stable over the period 1975 to 1991 (Table 15). However, the share of
technology and other knowledge indicators (including marketing, technical services
and consultancy) has increased from 40 per c nt of total human capital investment in
1975 to 57 per cent in 1991. The expenditure share on education has fallen
everywhere except for investment in company training. Government expenditure on20
education declined from about 22 per cent of the total budget in 1975 to about 16 per
cent in 1991. Clearly the decline of expenditure on education is partly determined by
demographic developments. However, Table 15 shows that after a correction for the
decline in the share of 0-19 year olds in the population, the share of expenditure on
primary and secondary education still shows a decline of 8 percentage points between
1982 and 1991.21
Even though overall expenditure on technology has increased during the 1980s, a
slowdown in growth has occurred since 1987. This is caused by the strong decline in
business R&D output ratios since the late 1980s, and has become a source of major
concern in the Netherlands. Not only was the decline in R&D intensity larger than22
in other countries European countries, the level of R&D intensity was also lower so
that the gap between the Netherlands and other countries increased considerably since
1987 (Diagram 6). In fact most of the decline in the R&D intensity originated from
the business sector, and in particular from five large firms in the Dutch economy
(AKZO, DSM, Philips, Shell and Unilever). These firms accounted for over 70 per
cent of business R&D in 1987 but for only 55 per cent in 1992.23
The gap in R&D intensity between the Netherlands and other OECD countries was
especially large in typical high-tech industries, such as electronics, aircrafts,
computers and pharmaceuticals. On the other hand the rise in R&D intensity in the
Netherlands was somewhat above average in petroleum refining, chemicals and food
processing. As mentioned above, the latter two industries accounted for a relatively
large share of employment in Dutch manufacturing. Indeed the "structural"
component (as opposed to the intrinsic component) of the difference in R&D
intensity between the Netherlands and an average for eight other OECD countries is
negative, in particular in comparison to Germany, Japan, Sweden and the UK.24
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In contrast to the decline in R&D intensity, import of technology has become
increasingly important over the past 15 years. In 1975 licenses accounted for only
2.3 per cent of total investment in human capital, but the share increased steadily up
to over 10 per cent of human capital investment in 1991 (Table 15).  A test on the25
elasticity of total factor productivity with respect to the investment in domestic R&D
versus the investment in foreign R&D suggests for the Netherlands an elasticity of
only 0.07 for domestic R&D versus 0.15 for foreign R&D. The effect on Dutch
productivity growth was the greatest for R&D expenditures in the USA (0.077)
followed by Germany (0.04). In conclusion, investment in R&D in foreign countries
had a greater effect on productivity growth in the N therlands than investment in the
country itself.26
(Semi-)public research institutes also account for a relatively share of investment in
technology in the Netherlands. In particular medium-sized firms rely to an important
extent on the supply of knowledge by public research institutes, because of the
limited scale advantages for investment in own R&D. In 1989 R&D intensity of
public research institutes in the Netherlands was 0.42 compared to an average of 0.37
for the eight OECD countries mentioned above. A relatively large part of the27
research in Dutch public research institutes is of a fundamental nature rath r than of
an applied nature or directed to development activities. For example, in 1989
fundamental research accounted for 31.7 per cent of R&D expenditures in Dutch
public research institutes compared to an average of 22 per cent for he eight OECD
countries mentioned above except the UK.
The population of working age (25-64 years old) in the Netherlands has relatively
high levels of qualifications compared to the OECD average and the EU (Table 16).
However, in comparison to the reference group of 11 Northwest European countries,
the share of persons with upper secondary qualifications is relatively small. This is
related to the fact that the latter category includes qualifications derived from
apprenticeship programmes. Historically these have been of less importance in the
Netherlands compared to neighbour countries in particular Germany. The Dutch28
education system may be characterised as "specialised" and concentrated on full-time
education. Until recently pupils choose at a relatively early stage between different
types of general and vocational schooling, though with the recent introduction of the
"basic education" (up to 16 years old) this selection moment is postponed until the
17
age of 15-16.  From age 16 onwards most pupils in the Dutch education system stay
on in full-time education of which more than half in full-time vocational education.
Unlike in the dual education system of Germany, apprentices are relatively
unimportant in the Netherlands. In 1991, apprentices in the Netherlands accounted for
21 per cent of pupils in upper secondary education compared to 57 per cent in
Germany.29
Given the importance of vocational education for the structural performance of an
economy, attainments levels of the population of working age may also be compared
in terms of vocational qualifications (Table 17). Compared to France and the UK the
share of the economically active population in the Netherlands without vocational
certificates is low. However, the share of lower intermediate vocational degrees
(which in this case includes the apprentices) is only 38 per cent compared to 56 per
cent in Germany. The Dutch labour force has the highest share of technicians with an
upper intermediate vocational certificate. Studies of productivity and30
competitiveness generally show that the degree of vocational training of the Dutch
labour force economy is fairly good. For example, the latest World Competitiveness
Report suggests average ratings for the judgments of Dutch employers on the
effectiveness of on-the-job training and the availability of technicians and
engineers.  Case studies at plant level on the link between productivity and31
education suggest that the Dutch productivity advantage over the United Kingdom can
be traced to higher levels of vocational education, mainly because of the greater
reliability and higher flexibility of the workforce. This is reflected in less machine
breakdowns and a more efficient use of the pool of workers.32
3. Correcting Structural Imbalances
Both wage moderation and economic policies aimed at the correction of structural
imbalances have probably contributed to the recent improvement in GDP per capita
and employment growth in the Netherlands as described in the previous sections. The
social partners generally accepted the basic principle that moderate wages are an
essential condition for increasing labour participation and improving international
18
competitiveness. However, wage moderation cannot be a substitute for more
fundamental measures to correct structural imbalances which may undermine the
working of labour, product and capital markets in the long term. Therefore, attention
has also been focused on structural reforms to improve economic performance. A
important aim of recent policies is to improve the flexibility and competitiveness of
the economy. Policy has focused on the reduction of the tax burden, competition
policy, deregulation and improvement of the infrastructure. These issues will be
reviewed below. Next the section deals with two issues that are currently under
debate: capital market imperfections and the alleged lack of economic dynamics in the
Netherlands.
Structural Reforms
One important policy aim since the beginning of the 1980s has been to reduce the tax
burden in order to enhance economic growth and to support employment growth. So
far, this policy has resulted in a considerable reduction in the share of government
outlays in national income. The size of the public sector, which ultimately determines
the tax burden, has decreased from 67 per cent of GDP in 1983 to 55 per cent in
1995. It is remarkable that the shrinking of the public sector took place under
coalition governments of various orientations, underlining the broad consensus o
this issue in Dutch politics.
With respect to competition policy there has also been progress. In the past, cartels
and other collusive agreements were not banned in principle. Action was taken only
against restrictive agreements which were considered contrary to the public interest,
or which were applied in a way contrary to that interest. Moreover, licensing rules
were widespread, restrictive and complex; and administred prices played a major role
in the public sector.  Over the past couple of years three decrees have been33
introduced prohibiting horizontal price agreements, market sharing agreements, and
collusive tendering, respectively. Furthermore, a concept for a new competition law
has been proposed. This new competition law will be based on the principles of the
European rules of competition: restrictive agreements and practices and abuses of a
dominant position by one or more parties will be prohibited. The new competition act
also provides for a system for control of market concentrations. If parliament accepts
the plans of the government - as seems likely - the enforcement of the new Dutch
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competion act will be executed by a new competion authority. Planned mergers with a
combined turnover of more than Gld 250 million, with at least two of the merging
parties having a minimum turnover of Gld 30 million in the Netherlands, will have to
be notified to the competition authority. Within one month the authority decides
whether a license is necessary to effectuate the merger. If a merger creates or
strengthens a dominant position a license is necessary; a decison whether the license
will be granted has to be taken within another three months. In case a license is not
granted, the merging parties can request the minister of Economic Affairs to overrule
the decision of the authority. Only in case the merger is considered to be in the public
interest the minister can approve of it.
Another possible hindrance to flexibility is government regulation. According to
recent research the Netherlands comes last in a rating of European Union member
countries with respect to flexibility of product and labour markets. This ranking is
based on nine different regulation indicators, including regulation for opening hours
for shops, mergers, working hours, temporary labour contracts and dismissal
procedures.  Other estimates suggest that if both the labour and goods markets had34
been more flexible over the period 1984-1990 output of firms and employment would
have been substantially higher. These calculations also suggest that a more flexible35
labour market on itself hardly affects output. Only in combination with more
flexibility in the goods markets does flexibilisation of the labour market have
substantial effects on output growth.
In the past, various governments had deregulation as their policy aim, but progress
in this field has been modest. The current government also started a deregulation
project. One of its first results has been the proposal to liberalise shop opening
hours. Regulation on opening hours of shops in the Netherlands is quite restrictive in
comparison with other European countries. The newly proposed legislation36
involves liberalisation of opening hours. In the government proposal opening hours
were free. Between midnight and 6.00 PM and on Sundays shops should in principle
remain closed, but municipalities will get the possibility to provide exemptions for
no more than twelve Sundays a year. It seems likely that liberalisation of opening
hours will lead to a higher level of average opening hours. This is an important
factor, since most estimated effects of a more liberal regime crucially depend on this
assumption. According to a recent study by the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) the
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government proposal would increase average opening hours by five hours. The CPB
concluded that total turnover will increase by 0.4 percentage point, due to increases
of prices and volume both by 0.2 percentage point. Total employment will increase
by about 10,000. The process towards scale increase will be furthered. 
An important aim of deregulation policy in the Netherlands is to reduce the
detrimental effects of regulation for business. These effects primarily involve
compliance costs. The main areas are health and safety, environment and taxes and
social security. Recent estimates of the total operating costs of taxation and public
transfers have been estimated at about 3 per cent of GDP in 1990; net compliance
costs of the tax-benefit system to business amounted to approximately 1 per cent of
GDP.  Legislation can also create specific barriers for new businesses and thus37
restrict competition. For instance, the Dutch Establishment Act prohibits the entry of
a new business without a proper license in more than 80 sectors. Licenses are issued
only if the entrepreneur holds a qualification which is recognized by the
government.  This legislation has recently been modernised. The number of38
licensing requirements has been reduced from about 90 to only eight; the new regime
has taken effect on 1 January 1996.
Another important goal of current policies is to improve the infrastructure of the
economy. In recent years plans have been drawn up for some large infrastructure
projects in the Netherlands, including the expansion of Amsterdam airport, the
connection of Amsterdam and Rotterdam to the European high speed railway network
and a direct freight raillink between Rotterdam and Germany (the "Betuwelijn").
Whereas the quality of airports and seaports in the Netherlands is generally regarded
as high, there are some deficiences with respect to the quality of roads an
railways.  These are related to congestion, especially in the so-called Randstad, and39
connections to the hinterland. There is broad consensus about the importance to
maintain an adequate level of public infrastructure in particular given the comparative
advantage of the Netherlands in the transport sector. 
The government also aims at the improvement of the technological infrastructure.
This is indeed very important since Dutch manufacturing is characterised by a strong
representation in industries with many skilled workers, as pointed out in the previous
section. One may therefore question whether budget cuts in education beyond the aim
to achieve efficiency gains may not be harmful for the economic performance of th
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Netherlands in the longer term. A recent white paper of the Dutch government,
Knowledge on the move ("Kennis in beweging"), observes that the education system
of the Netherlands does not sufficiently react to changing labour market conditions.
Furthermore, the match between public and private R&D needs to be improved by
stimulating investment in R&D and modernising the system of vocational education.
The major initiatives which are taken to achieve these policy objectives are fiscal
incentives to the private sector to increase business R&D and to create apprenticeship
positions, a strengthening of cooperation between the private and public research
sector through the creation of so-called cluster projects, centres of excellence,
regional training centres for basic education, general adult education, apprenticeship
and secondary vocational education, and through supporting the self-sufficiency of
public research institutes.
Two of these policy initiatives, i.e. a stronger orientation of the research of public
research institutes to the private sector and the support of apprenticeship systems,
deserve a specific comment. Clearly an efficient exchange between users and
suppliers of knowledge is important and policies to set up clusters between firms and
research institutes will be helpful in this regard. However, there may be limits to the
extent that small and medium sized enterprises, which benefit in particular from the
knowledge supplied by public research institutes, can give the right signals
concerning the demand for knowledge. Many of the new techniques which are applied
in these firms are likely to be supply- rather than demand driven. One may therefore
question whether a strengthening of the task of public research institutes to act as 
transferer to small- and medium sized companies of technologies mostly developed
in large firms or abroad may not be a better policy aim than a further withdrawal of
government support of these institutes. Indeed, other countries are increasing rather
than decreasing the governmental support of public research institutes. 40
Strengthening the apprenticeship system has some advantages in comparison to
full-time vocational education. An apprenticeship system increases opportunities for
people under eighteen to follow parttime education. It also widens the ability range in
creating training opportunities for low as well as high achievers and it provides
higher labour market value to skilled workers. An important reason for the small41
share of apprentices in the Dutch vocational education system is the limited ability
range which the system presently focuses on and its relatively low status compared to
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fulltime education. Furthermore, the costs of apprentices are presently too high. Most
apprentices have a labour market contract and earn at least the legal minimum wage
on a part-time basis. During the 1980s several policy measures were already taken to
increase the number of apprentices, which rose from about 60,000 in 1985 to about
150,000 now. The tax incentive (introduced in January 1996) which is meant to
lower the overall wage cost of apprentices could be an important stimulus, but the
rise of 18,000 apprenticeships which is foreseen over the next 3 years from a present
number of about 150,000 is modest compared to the 900,000 pupils receiving junior,
secondary and higher vocational education in the Netherlands. The measures
therefore need to be complemented by strengthening the performance of fulltime
vocational schools. In recent years many of those schools have been successful in
improving their cooperation with the private sector.
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Capital Market Imperfections
In raising external funds for investment purposes basically three options are available
for firms: stock issue, bond issue and bank loans. Diagram 7 shows that the amount
of money raised through the primary capital market is quite limited. It is not unique42
to the Netherlands that issues of new equity and bonds are not very important in
financing investment. Also in other OECD countries entry on the primary capital
market is not an available option for many firms. Only large firms are in a position
to raise funds in this way. A recent survey revealed that firms in the Netherlands
have a very strong preference for internal finance. Still, it may be argued that in the43
Netherlands the supply of risk-bearing capital is lacking due to three factors: 
 - various defensive devices to preclude hostile takeovers which make investment
in stock unattractive;
 - the Dutch system of contractual savings; and
 - the fiscal system in the Netherlands. 
These institutional features may cause the cost of capital to be high and will be
discussed in more detail.44
Defensive devices
In the Netherlands hostile takeovers are uncommon, which is due to the existence of
various defensive devices. The Dutch model of corporate finance, in which45
significant powers are attributed to the supervisory board whose members ar
appointed by co-optation, acts as a defensive device in the first place. In addition,
Dutch companies utilize a range of other anti-takeover devices. Currently a46
discussion is taking place as to how these defensive devices should be reduced. The
authorities have indicated they wish to reform the current system and give
shareholders more influence, thereby making investments in shares more attractive,
also for institutional investors. The foregoing analysis does not imply that the market
for corporate control in other European countries, where defensive devices are
generally less common, is necessarily more flexible than in the Netherlands. In many
other European countries other barriers for hostile takeovers exist. 47
Contractual savings
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The Netherlands has an elaborate pension system, with total assets invested by
pension funds amounting to 73 per cent of GDP in 1992. The pension fund for civil
servants is worth nearly half this sum. Adding the assets of life insurance companies
yields total assets of institutional investors of 113 per cent of GDP in the
Netherlands. Until recently pension funds, which are by far the most important
suppliers of savings, were reluctant to invest heavily in risk bearing assets. Share-
holdings by pension funds merely comprise 14 per cent of total assets (Table 18). As
a consequence, distribution of shares in the Netherlands is very divergent from that
in for example the UK, where pension funds are also very important suppliers of
savings. Besides a risk-averse investment policy by the funds, this is also due to a
legal restriction for the pension fund for civil servants that no more than 20 per cent
of funds may be invested in shares. This restriction will be cancelled with the
forthcoming privatisation of this pension fund. The pension fund for civil servants
has already announced that during the next five years it will increase investments in
shares with 13 billion Gld to a total of 28 billion Gld. 
Fiscal system
A third factor which is often pointed at as one of the factors that may influence th
availability and price of risk-bearing capital is the fiscal system of the Netherlands.
As in many other OECD countries effective tax rates on different forms of savings
vary widely in the Netherlands. This is due to various factors, including a favourable
tax treatment of contractual savings and different treatment of distributed company
profits compared with retained earnings. As concerning contractual savings, pension
contributions are deductible, whereas pension payments are taxed under the personal
income taxation scheme. As the marginal rate which applies for the deductions is
generally higher than the rate at which pensions are taxed, the public sector is in
effect subsidizing pension saving. The rate which applies for pension benefits is
lower than that for deductions for two reasons. First, the income level of retired
people is generally below their income level at working age. Second, pensioners do
not have to pay premiums for the public pension system (AOW). For non-contractual
savings the tax rules are quite different. Interest received is taxed under the personal
income taxation scheme, with an exemption of Gld 1,000. Due to high top income tax
brackets the differences between the tax treatment of both types of savings are
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relatively large. This may affect the availability of risk-bearing capital as pension
funds are quite risk-averse in their investment policies (see above).
Concerning the tax treatment of distributed company profits, the Netherlands
applies the so-called classical system with respect to taxation of company profits.
This implies that distributed profits are taxed twice: profits are first taxed at the firm
level while distributed profits are subsequently taxed under the personal income
taxation scheme. With a tax rate of 35 per cent, the Dutch level of profit tax rates is
not out of line with that in other countries. One attractive feature of Dutch profit48
taxation is the participation exemption. If a company owes at least 5 per cent of the
capital of another company, all proceeds derived from this participation are excluded
from the taxable profit of the holding company, once the profits of the company in
which it participates have been taxed under a foreign corporation income tax,
irrespective of the rate of this foreign tax profit. In comparison with other OECD
countries, Dutch company profit tax legislation has little possibilities for accelerated
depreciation. Still, rules for depreciation of assets and the valuation of inventories are
fairly generous in the Netherlands. In conclusion, profit taxation is not unfavourable
to investment. However, due to the relatively high rates of income taxation, the
overall tax rate on distributed profits is quite high in comparison with other
countries. This is due to the fact that, apart from an exemption of Gld 1,000,
dividends are taxed under the personal income taxation scheme. In 1991 this resulted
in an average tax rate on distributed profits of 67 per cent; in Belgium and Germany
these rates amounted to 54 and 44 per cent, respectively. The difference between the
level of taxation of retained and distributed profits is therefore quite high in the
Netherlands (32 per cent in 1991), which makes it attractive not to distribute profits,
especially since capital gains on shares are not taxed. This may have been a factor49
explaining the relative importance of retained earnings to finance investments in the
Netherlands, although there are also other possible explanations. Whether th
relatively high level of retained earnings has reduced the availability of risk-bearing
capital and increased its price is, however, less clear. On the one hand, shareholders50
are provided with less opportunities to reinvest distributed profits in risk-bearing
projects, which may reduce dynamism. On the other hand, a high level of retained
earnings is important, since most investments are financed in this way, irrespective
of the fiscal system.
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Lack of economic dynamics?
The possible existence of structural rigidities in goods and labour markets in the
Netherlands has been an important point of debate in recent years, and has also
influenced economic policy to a considerable extent. Indeed, the Coalition Agreement
of the present government states the improvement of the "dynamics" of the Dutch
economy as an explicit policy goal. An important issue here is how those dynamics
should be quantified. Indicators generally refer to market structure (like degree of
concentration), behaviour (like entry and exit of firms) and performance (like pric
cost margins, productivity and profitability). In a recent study principal components
analysis on various possible indicators has been applied to 29 sectors in the Dutch
economy.  It is shown that basically three independent components are relevant in51
describing dynamics: market power, capital intensity/export orientation, and a factor
called "business dynamics". The first dimension (market power) is primarily
determined by small-scaleness, seller concentration and deconcentration of buyers.
The second dimension is primarily determined by capital intensity and export
orientedness. These issue have already been dealt with in the previous chapter. Th
third dimension ("business dynamics") is primarily determined by entry and exit of
firms; these factors in turn are highly correlated. 
27
Market power in manufacturing
One way to analyse market power is to estimate price mark-ups. According to
standard neoclassical theory, prices will equal marginal costs in case of perfect
competition. Discrepancies between marginal costs and prices therefore may reflect
market power. Other reasons for mark-ups include sunk costs or innovation rents. In
a recent study price-cost margins (PCM) for 66 sectors of Dutch industry have been
examined over the period 1975-1986, which shows that the gap between the highly
concentrated high-PCM industries and the l ss concentrated low-PCM industries has
disappeared over time. Price-cost margins in Dutch manufacturing industries appear
to depend on the interplay of seller and buyer concentration, capital intensity, the
degree of industry's capacity utilization, the growth of industry's sales and the level
of exports.  It also appears that Dutch industries react to both demand and capacity52
utilisation. The long term impact of these factors is considerably higher than their
short term influence. 
Table 19 shows the estimates of mark-ups in various industrial countries. Mark-
ups in Dutch manufacturing are not exceptional.   
Market power in banking
Concentration in Dutch banking is relatively high. In 1990 the market share of the
five largest banks as percentage of total assets amounted to 84 per cent. In Germany
and the United Kingdom the corresponding figures were 27 and 28 per cent,
respectively.  An important issue is whether this has reduced competition, thereby53
leading to excessive rates, to less credit supply and high profits in the banking sector.
In household and corporate loan markets, there is a relatively high mark-up in the
Netherlands over the period 1984-1991. The same is true for the deposit market,
where the Netherlands even comes top of the list. According to a recent interview54
survey of bank behaviour in the Netherlands, most banks believe to have som
market power with regard to a wide range of products, irrespective of the particular
type of client concerned. These products include business loans, consumer credit,
mortgages, demand and time deposits, savings accounts and payments services. Most
banks indicated that competition from foreign banks in domestic financial markets is
not very substantial. In fact, competition from non-bank financial institutions in the
Netherlands, such as insurance companies, pension funds and investment companies,
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is generally felt to be more severe, especially where mortgages and government loans
are concerned.  As for the other types of loans, banks have large market shares,55
ranging from 41 per cent for consumer credit to about 65 per cent for business loans
at the end of 1992. Concentration in the Dutch market for savings deposits ha
increased markedly through the years. Specifically the joint share of the three largest
players in this market rose from around 60 per cent in the 1960s to some 80 per cent
in 1990. Moreover, owing to mergers, the number of independent savings banks in
the Netherlands dropped from 248 in 1960 to 100 in 1975 and to 21 in 1990.
Concentration tendencies have had less impact on competitiveness in the mortgage
market, where the degree of oligopoly decreased. However, in 1990 the market power
of mortgage lenders was still significant, suggesting that a situation of perfect
competition in this market is still a long way off.56
Although there is substantial evidence that many financial retail markets possess
oligopolistic characteristics, profits in Dutch banking do not seem to be excessive.
Interest margins in Dutch banking appear to be quite modest, also during the more
recent period (Table 20). With respect to efficiency the Dutch banking sector also has
a relatively good position. Productivity in banking is quite high (see also Diagram 2).
In 1992 gross income per bank employee in the Netherlands was below the EU
average. Staff costs as percentage of the total balance sheet were also relatively low.
Business dynamics
As pointed out above, the "business dynamics" dimension is primarily determined by
entry and exit of firms, which in turn are highly correlated. Table 21 shows that the
number of registrations of new firms in the Netherlands is considerably higher than
the median in Europe. This indicator of dynamism does not provide any information
about whether these new firms were able to adapt to market circumstances (another
aspect of dynamism) and survive. However, Table 21 also shows that the survival
rate in the Netherlands was the highest of all European countries for which data are
available. Almost one third of new enterprises in the Netherlands was started in trade
and repairs, and relatively less in manufacturing and construction. As in other
countries the Netherlands show a declining share of manufacturing and an increasing
importance of services in terms of new start-ups.57
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4. Conclusion: The Need for Further Improvements
As pointed out in the previous sections, Dutch economic performance in terms of
GDP per capita growth has improved considerably since the late 1980s both in
comparison with the recent past and compared to the OECD, the European Union and
Northwest Europe. Progress has also been made with respect to the correction of
structural imbalances. Although the growth rate of the number of persons employed
has been impressive as well, the Dutch economy has not been able to accommodate
the rapid increase in labour supply since the mid 1980s. Furthermore, productivity
growth has stagnated. Although the labour force participation rate in the Netherlands
is now at the OECD average, it is expected that labour supply will increase further in
coming years. Given the rise in labour supply and the need to prevent a slowdown in
per capita income growth taking place in the long term, it will be necessary for the
Netherlands to further improve the economic performance and to use the increasing
labour supply as effectively as possible. The currently high level of broad
unemployment (i.e. all beneficiaries of social security as a percentage of the
population at working age) and its uneven incidence across labour f rce groups only
underline this imperative. Obviously not all persons in broad unemployment can be
expected to be integrated in the labour process in the next few years. However, even
underemployment (defined as the rate of those receiving unemployment benefit plus
the unemployed who wish to work but do not actively look for work because they
believe no suitable job is available plus part-time workers who usually work fulltime
or who would prefer to work fulltime) is relatively high compared to the OECD
average.  A fundamental question in this respect is what the rise in labour supply5 8
will do to the average productivity performance at macro level. A recent study on the
link between inactivity and labour productivity suggests that a decline in inactivity
rates may lead to both a rise in GDP and lowering of average productivity because of
the lower productivity performance of those persons who were inactive before.59
Indeed the evidence presented in the previous sections suggest this is what happened
in the Netherlands over the past years. The negative impact of the growth of labour
supply on the productivity growth rate is strengthened by the fact that most new jobs
were created in services industries where wages and productivity growth are low
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compared to those in commodity sectors of the economy. In addition, productivity
levels in some services sectors - like trade - are low compared to those in other
countries. Furthermore, many newly created jobs are parttime jobs. Given the already
exceptionally high level of parttime work in the Netherlands, it seems likely that the
productivity loss of creating more parttime jobs might be quite substantial as most of
these jobs will end up at the lower end of the productivity scale. In addition there is
some evidence that working time reduction schemes also create a substantial
productivity loss, in particular when labour time shortening schemes are realised in
terms of creating less working days per person (as has usually been the case in th
Netherlands) rather than shortening the working day.60
The combination of rapid growth of employment (even when these are parttime
jobs) and lower productivity has, of course, positive effects in the short run, like a
significant reduction in social security expenditure. However, when the additionally
created employment leads to productivity losses, in the longer run per capita income
growth may be negatively affected. The focus should therefore be on accommodating
the rise in labour supply not primarily by redistributing labour but by creating
additional labour time of a high productivity nature, which is most likely to be
situated in industry and services sectors like transport, communication and finance.
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Table 12
Gross saving and investment (%GDP), 1960-1993
gross saving gross investment
1960- 1974- 1980- 1990- 1960- 1960- 1974-79 1980- 1990- 1963-90
73 79 89 93 93 73 89 93
Netherlands 27.5 23.4 23.0 24.4 25.1 25.6 21.5 20.1 20.3 22.7
EU15 25.0 22.6 20.5 19.5 22.6 23.7 22.7 20.6 20.3 22.2
OECD Europe 24.9 22.6 20.8 19.9 22.7 23.7 22.7 20.8 20.6 22.3
OECD 23.7 22.7 21.2 19.9 22.3 22.2 22.6 21.3 20.4 21.8
Source: OECD Historical Statistics
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Table 13
Rates of return on capital in the business sector, 1970-1994
Netherlands European countries OECD Japan USA
1970-78 13.7 13.1 15.0 18.3 15.8
1979-86 15.4 11.8 13.4 14.0 14.5
1987-94 17.7 13.6 15.2 14.4 17.0
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, June 1995
Tabel 14
Foreign direct investment in the Netherlands and Dutch investment, 1973-94
1973-79 1980-86 1987-94
Foreign direct investment:
- growth rate (%) 14 15 17
- % GDP 0.52 0.83 2.24
of which from:
- European Union 55% 48% 63%
Dutch direct investment abroad:
- growth rate 19 4 27
- % GDP 2.11 2.19 4.21
of which to:
- European Union 59% 58% 58%
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank
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Diagram 4
Private sector investment, 1950-1994 (% value added)
Note: The investment series exclude government investment. The series have been
constructed using the definition for investment in the most recent period and linking it
to earlier series in 1985 and in 1969.
Source: Central Planning Bureau.
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Diagram 5
Development of Public Capital Spending as a percentage of GDP
Notes: The data relate to consolidated general government. Greece is not displayed in the
figure, because data is only available until 1989.
 Average over 1990-1991.*
Source: OECD, National Accounts.
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Diagram 7
Private sector issues of equity and bonds at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange
(as percentage of private investment), 1980-1994
Source: Amsterdam Stock Exchange, Annual exports
Table 18
Ownership of shares in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK
Germany Netherlands UK
households 19.7 23.0 20.0
non-financial enterprises 39.1 11.1  8.0
banks  8.1  0.8  --
investment funds  3.5  1.5  8.0
insurance companies and  2.7 14.4 52.0
pension funds
government  7.0  0.8  3.0
foreign 20.0 48.3  9.0
Source: G.M.M. Gelauff, Corporate governance in Germany and the Netherlands,
Central Planning Bureau, The Hague, 1995.
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Table 19
Mark-ups for manufacturing, averages adjusted for material inputs and indirect
taxes, 1970-92 (employment weighted average)
1970-92 1970-80 1980-92
United States 1.16 1.24 1.16
Japan 1.20 1.47 1.18
Germany 1.16 1.13 1.19
France 1.17 1.23 1.16
United Kingdom 1.18 1.23 1.20
Canada 1.23 1.27 1.22
Australia 1.20 1.21 1.22
Belgium 1.18 1.30 1.17
Denmark 1.16 1.20 1.15
Finland 1.30 1.28 1.37
Italy 1.14  -- 1.23
Netherlands 1.22 1.25 1.19
Norway 1.28 1.53 1.32
Sweden 1.21 1.40 1.18
Source: J.O. Martins, S. Scarpetta nd D. Pilat, "Mark-ups of Prices over Marginal Costs
for 14 OECD Economies", OECD Economics Department Working Paper, forthcoming.
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Table 20
Dutch banking in perspective, 1992
Netherlands EU US Japan German
y
value added (% GDP) 5.5 5.2 3.6 2.0 3.8
banking employment 2.25 1.84 na 0.61 2.30
(% of total employment)
number of employees 15.9 14.8 na 27.9 17.2
per branch
ibid (1984=100) 95.9 107.5 na 74.5 105.4
gross income per 114.1 117.9 na 139.8 86.6
employee
(1000 ECUs)
ibid (1984=100) 164.9 121.1 na 136.0 130.2
staff costs (% balance 1.01 1.21 1.58 0.48 1.11
sheet total)
relative productivity 2.45 2.84 na 3.35 1.68
(productivity banking/
 productivity economy)
interest margin 1984- 2.26 2.20 3.42 1.20 2.28
1989
interest margin 1990- 1.81 2.13 3.69 1.13 2.05
1993
Source: K. Lannoo, D. Schoenmaker and S. Van Tilborg (1993), The Single Market in




1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 chan- survival rate af-
ge ter:
1 year 3 years
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Netherlands 100 109 112 121 135 +35   90       74
Europe-16 100 103 99 99.5 99 -1   87       68
(median
value)
Source: European Network for SME research, 3rd Annual report
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Appendix A - Growth Equations
In recent years a range of empirical studies have been carried out with the aim to
establish the explanatory role of a wide range of variables in relation to economic
growth with the help of regression analysis. The equations in these studies generally
included a catch-up variable (proxied by the per capita income level at the beginning
of the period), a variable for investment in physical capital and a variable for
education. In addition variables for the openness of the economy, the socio-political
system and fiscal and monetary policies are often included as well.61
Recently the OECD's Economic Survey, New Zealand 1992-1993 estimated some
growth equations for OECD countries for the period 1960-1985 following the
specifications from Barro (1991) (see Table A.1, equation 1). Diagram A.1A, which
shows the deviation of the actual growth of the Solow residual from the predicted
growth rate, suggests that the Netherlands is the country which performs worst in
this respect. The conclusion which was derived for New Zealand, i.e. that "... a
substantial adverse impact of structural rigidities associated with the protected and
non-competitive nature of the economy" (OECD, op. cit., pp. 134-136), would
therefore stand out even more clearly for the Netherlands.
However, regression analysis of this nature appears to be very sensitive to the
structural variables included and their specification. Equation 2 in Table A.1 shows
an alternative specification of the growth equation, where the variable for government
consumption is dropped , and another crucial variable, namely the investment-output62
ratio, is included. Diagram A.1B shows that the Netherlands does not anymore
exhibit exceptionally high negative residuals, although it is still slightly
underperforming compared to the estimated residual. The results from equation 263
point towards a substantial role for investment explaining growth of real GDP.




Growth Accounting Equations, Barro-type
Dependent variable: growth of real GDP per capita in OECD countries, 1960-85
Equatio Constan GDP60 HSGVX FERTNE SEC6 INV R
n t D T 0 (adj)
2
1 0.069 -0.0055 -0.043 -0.079 0.0- 0.76
(10.36) (-8.41) (-1.86) (-3.96) 123
(2.16)
2 0.030 -0.0044 0.0- 0.052 0.58 
(3.98) (-5.30) 113 (1.95)
(1.51)
Notes: equation (1) is identical to estimation from OECD (1993). Equation (2) is our
own version.
Definition of the variables:
GDP60 1960 value of real per capita GDP;
HSGVXD Average of real government consumption (excl. defense and education) to
real GDP;
FERTNET FERT * (1 - MORT04), where FERT is total fertility rate (average 1965-
85) and MORT04 is mortality rate for age 0 - 4 (average 1965-85);
SEC60 1960 secondary school enrollment rate;
INV investment to GDP (average 1965-85).
Source: OECD Secretariat estimates
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Appendix B - Growth Accounting
Growth accounting studies are another vehicle to shed light on the major underlying
economic performance from a structural perspective. The most outstanding work on
growth accounting from a viewpoint of international comparability is that of
Maddison (for example, Maddison, 1987). Table B.1 reproduces growth64
accounting results for the Netherlands and its deviation from the performance of
France, Germany and the UK for two periods (1950-73 and 1973-92). A positive
sign for the deviation implies a higher value for this variable in the Netherlands,
whereas a negative sign implies a lower value. The first three variables in Table B.1
concern the growth rates of real GDP, GDP per augmented unit of labour input, and
GDP per combined unit of augmented labour and capital. The following rows sho
the contribution of augmented labour and capital nput to real GDP growth, weighted
at their factor income shares in GDP. An important feature of growth accounts is that
these enable a further decomposition of the Solow residual into factors such as the
effects of foreign trade, resource allocation and economies of scale on growth.
It appears that for both periods more than three-quarters of output growth in the
Netherlands could be accounted for by the factors which Maddison calculated. The
comparison with the other three countries suggests that the somewhat slower growth
of the Netherlands compared to France and Germany during the period 1950 to 1973
could be accounted for in particular by the slower growth in the physical capital
stock. However, the much greater positive effect of foreign trade on growth for the
Netherlands compared to the other three larger countries more than offsets th
dampening effect of slower capital input growth, even after accounting for the
negative effect of structural change on Dutch economic growth.
During the period 1973 to 1992 the Dutch economy performed much better than the
other countries on the creation of employment although this effect was more than
offset by the decline in working hours per person employed. The impact of a slower
growth in capital stock compared to France was somewhat stronger during this period
than during the period 1950-73, but it was weaker compared to the other two
countries. Most important was that the positive foreign trade effect was of much less
importance for the Netherlands during this period. Apart from the strongly diverging
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effects of the number of hours per employee, the foreign trade effect and the
structural effect, it is also striking from the Maddison data that Dutch performance in
education was above average.
64
1. The original growth equation is derived from OECD, OECD Economic Survey.
New Zealand 1992-1993, Paris, Appendix A. It regressed the growth in real
government consumption, population growth and secondary school enrollment on
the growth of real GDP per capita. See Appendix A for a more technical
explanation of the estimation of economic growth in the Netherlands, including the
alternative specification which includes the investment-output ratio.
2. Ministry of Economic Affairs, Toets op het concurrentievermogen.
Achtergrondrapport (Test on Competitiveness), Den Haag, 1995.
3. Here the change in labour force participation is not adjusted for changes in the
share of the population younger than 15 years and from 65 years onwards.
4. The better performance of the OECD as a whole is mainly due to the greater degree
of job creation (without a substantial productivity loss) in the non-European
OECD countries. See OECD (1994), The OECD Jobs Study, Evidence and
Explanations, Part I: Labour Market Trends and Underlying Forces of Change,
Paris.
5. The capital stock estimates are based on the perpetual inventory method, which
cumulates gross investment on an annual basis and scraps past investments after an
assumed length of time representing average asset lives. The estimates are derived
from A. Maddison (1995), "Standardised Estimates of Capital Stock: A Six
Country Comparison", in: Explaining the Economic Performance of Nations,
Essays in Time and Space, Edward Elgar Publishers, Aldershot, and updated to
1994 with investment figures from Centraal Plan Bureau (1995), Centraal
Economisch Plan 1995, Den Haag.
6. These growth accounts are obtained from A. Maddison (1996), "Macroeconomic
Accounts for European Countries", in B. van Ark and N.F.R. Crafts, eds.,
Quantitative Aspects of Postwar European Economic Growth, CEPR/Cambridge
University Press. See Appendix A for a more technical explanation and results.
7. It should be emphasised that the productivity level for the economy as a whole in
the Netherlands was relatively high in comparison to other countries (Table 2), so
that Diagram 2 somewhat understates the sectoral productivity of the Netherlands
in absolute terms.
8. See B. van Ark (1995), "Sectoral Growth Accounting and Structural Change i
Postwar Europe", Research Memorandum GD-23, University of Groningen. The
author emphasises the limitations of this counterfactual approach, called shift-
share analysis. Firstly, the focus of any structural change study should preferably
be on the effect of employment shifts on marginal instead of on average
productivity. Secondly, structural transformation does not only refer to sectoral
employment shifts, but also to changes in demand, trade, and resource use patterns.
See also OECD (1994), op. cit. (table 1.7), which shows that the dispersion of
employment changes across sectors in the Netherlands has been relatively small
compared to the OECD average during the 1970s and 1980s.
9. F. Suijker en P. Eering (1994), "Het belang van de industrie voor de
werkgelegenheid", ESB, 6 April, pp. 325-326.
10. L. Broersma and P.A. Gautier (1995), "Vernietiging en creatie van banen in de
industrie", ESB, 2-8-1995, pp. 685-689.
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11. See B. van Ark (1994), "Arbeidsproduktiviteit, arbeidskosten en international
concurrentie", ESB, 23 November, pp. 1066-1068. When the Dutch manufacturing
productivity levels for 1987 are weighted by the US employment structure, th
productivity advantage over the US of 5.4 percentage points turned into a
disadvantage of 9.2 percentage points.
12. Chemicals, excluding pharmaceuticals, are included in the medium-tech segment.
See OECD (1994), op. cit., Part I, Annex 4.A.
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growth in the domestic sector exceeded the growth of employment in the domestic
sector, especially after 1985. Labour productivity has risen faster in the
international sector. This may be due to lack of dynamism in the sheltered sector,
but it may also be due to the fact that most services are included in this sector
which in general have a lower potential for rapid productivity growth than the
commodity sector. See B. van Ark, J. de Haan and R.D.J. Kouwenhoven (1993),
"Het dynamische tekort van Nederland", ESB, 8 December, pp. 1131-1134.
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services, but smaller in transport and communication and even below the European
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in firms which had a similar size (in transport and communication) or even smaller
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66
Economic Studies, no. 17, 1991, pp. 63-89; and J.E. Sturm and J. de Haan, "Is
Public Expenditure Really Productive? New Evidence for the US and the
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